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Tipping the Scales of Justice in Sexual Harassment Law 
ANNE LAWTON" 
"[W] ithout the realistic threat of legal sanctions, women's voices too 
often go unheard or unheeded. "1 
Between 1992 and 2000, the number of charges of sexual harassment 
filed with the EEOC and state fair employment agencies rose from 10,532 to 
15,836, an increase of 50% in less than adecade.2 These figures, however, are 
simply the tip of the iceberg. Research consistently finds that a very small 
percentage of women3 ( 1-6%) who experience harassing events actually report 
the harassment.4 Some might argue that most women do not file charges of 
* Law Clerk, The Honorable David W. McKeague, Western District of Michigan. A.B., M.B.A., 
J.D. University of Michigan. I wish to thank the editorial board of the OHIO NORTHERN LAw REVIEW for 
asking me to participate in this symposium on sexual harassment law and the faculty at the Pettit College 
of Law for its support and advice. 
@Anne Lawton 2001. 
I. DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY I 04 ( 1997). 
2. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & 
FEPAs Combined: FY 1992 -FY 2000, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last modified Jan. 18, 
2001). Because these figures include charges also filed with state fair employment agencies, they better 
reflect the actual number of sexual harassment charges filed than do the figures for charges filed with the 
EEOC alone. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Trends in Harassment Charges Filed 
With The EEOC During the 1980s and 1990s, at http://www.eeoc.gov/statslharassment.html (last modified 
July II, 2000). 
3. Throughout this Article, I refer to the victims of sexual harassment as "women" or "female" and 
the perpetrators of sexual harassment as "men" or "male." Although men do experience sexual harassment 
at work, see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), the typical harassment case 
involves a male harasser and a female victim. See RHODE, supra note I, at 97 (footnote omitted) (noting 
that more than 90% "of reported cases involve males harassing females"); Anne Lawton, The Emperor's 
New Clothes: How the Academy Deals with Sexual Harassment, II YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, I I 8 n.278 
(1999) (citing sources for proposition that women are significantly more likely to be victims of sexual 
harassment and that their harassers are overwhelmingly male); see also Elissa L. Perry et al., Propensity 
to Sexually Harass: An Exploration of Gender Differences, 38 SEX ROLES 443,454 (1998) (noting that in 
their study of 67 male and 97 female undergraduates women showed "significantly lower propensities to 
harass members of the opposite sex than [did] men"). 
4. See U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PRorncnON BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHAlLENGES 33-34 (1995), available at 
http://www.mspb.gov/studies/studies.html [hereinafter MSPB REPORT Ul] (finding that only 6% of victims 
took some form of formal action, defined as (I) requesting an investigation, (2) filing a complaint or 
lawsuit, or (3) filing a "grievance or adverse action appeal"); U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 27 ( 1988) [hereinafter MSPB REPORT 
II] (explaining that its finding that 5% of victims took formal action was an overstatement because many 
victims considered telling their supervisor to be a formal action); Lawton, supra note 3, at 89-92; id. at 152-
54 Thl. II (providing reporting figures from formal and informal complaints obtained from seven academic 
institutions); Anita F. Hill, Sexual Harassment: 111e Nature of the Beast, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1445, 1447 
(1992) (noting that "only three to five percent of women file claims of harassment"). 
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harassment because the behavior causes no harm. The research belies that 
assumption: "even relatively mild experiences with sexual harassment" carry 
with them negative work-related, psychological, and health consequences.5 
Thus, contrary to the often unsubstantiated claims of sexual harassment law 
critics that the law has run amok, catering to the hypersensitive,6 a growing 
body of empirical research shows that sexual harassment, both in the 
workplace and the academy, not only is pervasive but pemicious.7 
What accounts for the persistence of sexual harassment as a problem? 
The answer lies with the incentives created by sexual harassment law itself. 
The law is littered with procedural and substantive hurdles that significantly 
reduce not only the number of meritorious complaints of harassment that are 
filed, but also the number of cases in which any meaningful review of the 
actions of employers or educational institutions is undertaken. While paying 
lip service to the goal of sexual equality, both on the job and in the academy, 
the law tips the scales in favor of employers and educational institutions, 
creating disincentives for women to file legitimate complaints of sexual 
harassment and ensuring that they receive little relief if they do so. 
Part I of this Article discusses the impact of the extremely short statute 
of limitations for sexual harassment claims. I argue that severely limiting the 
time frame within which to file a complaint of sexual harassment sharply 
reduces the number of complaints actually filed, even those that are 
meritorious. In Part II, I ask why prospective plaintiffs in both Title VII8 and 
5. Vicki J. Magley et al., Outcomes ofSelj-l.Jlbeling Sexual Harassment, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
390, 400 (1999); see Kimberly T. Schneider et al., Job-Related and Psychological Effects of Sexual 
Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from Two Organizations, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 401, 
412 (1997). 
6. RHODE, supra note 1, at 97 (citing to commentators who describe supporters of harassment law 
as "overzealous," "hypersensitive," or "neurotics"); cf. Magley et al., supra note 5, at 400-0 I (debunking 
"whiner hypothesis" advocated by certain "backlash" writers); Schneider et al., supra note 5, at 413 
(concluding that their "study provide[d] important evidence that the women who experience sexual 
harassment are not oversensitive to benign compliments or comments"). 
7. See MSPB REPORT m. supra note 4, at viii, 26 (finding that 44% of female and 19% of male 
employees reported unwanted sexual attention at work and estimating that sexual harassment cost the 
federal government $327.1 million during the two-year period covered by the survey); MSPB REPORT II, 
supra note 4, at 11,40 (finding that 42% of women and 14% of men reported unwanted sexual attention 
on the job and estimating the cost of harassment at $267.3 million for the two-year period covered by the 
survey); U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTEcnON BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: 
IS IT A PROBLEM? 35 Fig. 3-2 ( 1981) (finding that 42% of female and 15% of male survey respondents had 
experienced unwanted sexual attention at work); Lawton, supra note 3, at 78-85 (discussing results of 
various studies on the incidence of harassment); Hill, supra note 4, at 1445 (noting that sexual harassment 
"occurs today at an alarming rate" affecting "anywhere from forty-two to ninety percent of women ... 
during their working lives"). 
8. Title VII governs employees' allegations of sexual harassment on the job. See 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a)( I) (1994) (prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of sex "with respect to [an 
individual's] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"). 
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Title IX9 sexual harassment cases must use grievance procedures designed, 
created, and implemented by the potential defendant - the employer or 
educational institution- before filing suit. I argue that the conflict of interest 
inherent in the private system of internal dispute resolution for sexual 
harassment claims creates improper incentives for employers and educational 
institutions and discourages plaintiffs from invoking such procedures. Finally, 
Part m examines the alarming rate at which courts grant summary judgment 
to employers in sexual harassment cases. 10 By doing so, they not only deprive 
plaintiffs of the right to present their case to a jury; they also insulate 
employers' internal grievance procedures from any meaningful external 
scrutiny. 
Standing alone, a short statute of limitations or an extra layer of 
procedure serves as a deterrent to the filing of meritorious claims of 
harassment. The cumulative impact of a short statute of limitations, an 
additional layer of procedure, and an increased likelihood of losing on 
summary judgment, however, is formidable. These obstacles to recovery send 
a powerful message about the law's willingness to listen to women's stories 
of harassment. 
I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The statute of limitations, 11 for any type of claim, acts as a barrier to 
entry. 12 The shorter the time period, the more likely it is that claims, both 
valid and invalid, will not be investigated. Because sexual harassment is a 
9. Title IX governs allegations of sexual harassment made by students against school, college, or 
university personnel. See 20 U .S.C. § 1681 (a) ( 1994)(prohibiting, with certain exceptions, discrimination 
on the basis of sex in "any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"). 
I 0. This trend in the federal courts of granting employer motions for summary judgment in sexual 
harassment cases is part of a larger pattern seen in other employment discrimination cases. See Anne 
Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REv. 587 
(2000) (describing the large number of Title Vll race and sex discrimination claims disposed of on em-
ployer motions for summary judgment). 
II. Eight years ago, Louise Fitzgerald recommended extending the time period for filing claims of 
sexual harassment, explaining that a longer time period was more consistent with the "[p)sychological 
research on victim behavior." Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: Violence Against Women in the 
Workplace, 48 AM. PsYCHOL. 1070, 1074 (1993). 
12. See Daniels v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 1578, 1582-83 (200l)(citationomitted)(explainingthat 
while a criminal defendant has many chances to challenge the constitutionality of his conviction. such 
opportunities are not without limit because '[p)rocedural barriers, such as statutes of limitations and rules 
concerning procedural default and exhaustion of remedies, operate to limit access to review on the merits 
of a constitutional claim"); see also Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The limitations Debates, 1991 U. 
ILL. L. REv. 683, 685, 687 (noting legislative efforts to limit the statute of limitations in products liability 
and medical malpractice claims as a tort reform measure aimed at reducing the number of such claims). 
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Title Vll claim, 13 an employee claiming harassment must file a charge with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) no later than 180 days 
from the harassing event. 14 In those states with enforcem~nt agencies for fair 
employment laws, the plaintiff employee has 300 days from the harassing 
event to file. 15 
Ten months or 300 days, which is the maximum time period allowed, is 
significantly shorter than the statute of limitations for many other causes of 
action. For example, in Ohio, the statute of limitations for breach of sales 
contracts under the Uniform Commercial Code is four years from the date of 
breach. 16 For tort actions involving claims of trespass upon real property or 
for relief based on fraud, the relevant statute of limitations also is four years. 17 
It is important to realize that establishing a statute of limitations is a 
choice. 18 For example, in Lamp/. Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. 
Gilbertson, 19 the Supreme Court held that in private causes of action pursuant 
to § IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193420 plaintiffs must initiate 
litigation within one year of discovering "the facts constituting the violation" 
and no later than three years after the violation occurred. 21 The Court rejected 
both the Securities and Exchange Commission's suggested five-year statute 
of repose, 22 as well as "the traditional rule of applying a state limitations 
period when the federal statute is silent."23 Had the Court accepted the state 
limitations period, as had both the trial court and the Ninth Circuit done, 
plaintiffs would have had two years from the time that they discovered the 
fraud to file suit.24 Moreover, by forcing plaintiffs to file suit no later than 
three years after the violation occurred, regardless of when plaintiffs 
discovered the violation, the Court created a rule in "conflict[] with traditional 
13. Sexual harassment is considered a fonn of sex discrimination under Title VII. 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11 (a) (1997) (footnote omitted) (stating that "[h]arassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 
703 of title VII"). 
14. BARBARA LiNDEMANN & DAVID D. l<ADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 449 
(1992). 
15. ld. 
16. OHJOREV.CODEANN. § 1302.98(West 1994). 
17. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.09(A), (C)(West 1994 ). For fraud, the cause of action does not 
accrue until discovery of the fraud. /d. 
18. Cf Weinberg, supra note 12, at 686 (footnote omitted) (noting that statutes of limitation are 
"demonstrably arbitrary" and that legislatures make choices about the length of time to set for different 
causes of action). 
19. 501 u.s. 350 (1991). 
20. 15 u.s.c. § 78j (1994). 
21. LampJ, 501 U.S. at 363. 
22. ld. at 361. 
23. ld. at 368 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
24. See id. at 353-54. 
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limitations periods for fraud-based actions [and] frustrate[ d) the usefulness of 
§ lO(b) in protecting defrauded investors."25 By limiting the period in which 
plaintiffs could file suit, the Court restricted the availability of relief under § 
lO(b)'s private cause· of action.26 
Why is a short statute of limitations for sexual harassment claims such 
a problem? First, as a matter of policy, recognizing a cause of action but 
attaching to it a short statute of limitations sends a message about what claims 
legislatures and courts want parties to pursue vigorously. 
Especially short periods of limitation or periods set without regard to 
the plaintiff's state of knowledge might be seen as undermining the 
policies supporting the right sued on, undercutting general policies 
supporting the whole field of law, or negating procedural policies 
favoring access to courts, trial by jury, rights to notice and hearing, 
and so forth. 27 
Second, as a practical matter, a short statute of limitations is at odds with the 
ways in which many victims of harassment respond.28 Depending on the 
nature of the harassing events, it may take a woman time to process what has 
25. ld. at 374 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
26. The short statute of limitations that the Supreme Court judicially created in Lamp/. reflects, in 
part, some Justices' discomfort with the implied cause of action under § 1 O(b). See Lmnpf, 50 l U.S. at 364-
66 (Scalia, J ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that because Congress did not 
create the private cause of action under§ 1 O(b ), the most "responsible approach" for determining the statute 
of limitations was to use "a limitations period for an analogous cause of action" from the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934). 
Chief Justice Rehnquistjoined the Court's opinion in Lamp/. authored by Justice Blackmun. 
In an earlier§ IO(b) case, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), authored by 
Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that plaintiffs in a§ lO(b) case must be actual purchasers or sellers of 
securities. ld. at 754-55. The Court noted that the§ lO(b) cause of action was a "judicial oak which ha[d] 
grown from little more than a legislative acorn." ld. at 737. Therefore, policy concerns, such as the "danger 
of vexatious litigation," suggested caution in expanding the class of plaintiffs able to avail themselves of 
§ lO(b)'s private cause of action. /d. at 739-49. See also FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAw 
577-79 (2000) (commenting that Justice Rehnquist's discussion of vexatious litigation in Blue Chip Stamps 
revealed a "hostility toward securities lawsuits" that "presaged a shift in the attitude by the Supreme Court 
toward Rule I Ob-5," reflected in later decisions that "seemed to retrench on the reach of the Rule"). 
27. Weinberg, supra note 12, at 686. 
28. See Fitzgerald, supra note II, at 1074 (stating that the short statute of limitations is 
unreasonable "[g]iven the numerous factors that inhibit women from complaining to anyone, much less 
filing a formal complaint"); cj Lisa S. Tsai, Note, Continuing Confusion: The Application of the 
Continuing Violation Doctrine to Sexual Harassment Law, 79 TEX. L. REv. 531,554-56 (2000) (discuss-
ing research on victims' responses to harassment and noting that "existing continuing violation and sexual 
harassment jurisprudence ... fails to account for the varying responses manifested by victims of sexual 
harassment"); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 
U. Pm. L. REV. 671,722-29 (2000) (discussing the research on victims' responses to sexual harassment 
and describing many women's decisions not to use employer grievance procedures as "rational"). 
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happened to her at work. 29 She may fear retaliation or not know how to 
proceed, delaying her decision to seek legal redress.30 In addition, the impact 
of harassment is often cumulative; a woman may brush aside early harassing 
events only to realize later that those events were the beginning of a pattern 
of harassment that has not abated. · 
Moreover, the continuing violation doctrine, as applied by the courts, has 
not served to mitigate the harshness ofTitle Vll's short statute oflimitations.31 
The continuing violation theory allows a court to examine harassing events 
that occur outside the 300-day limitations period so long as they form part of 
a pattern of harassing conduct that continues into the 300-day limitations 
period.32 The doctrine, however, is applied unevenly across the circuits and, 
at times, even within the same circuit. 33 For example, suppose a female 
plaintiff files suit alleging ten different harassing events, only four of which 
fall within the 300-day limitations period. If the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the harassing events within the 300-day limitations period, standing alone, 
are severe or pervasive, the plaintiff is more likely to lose, notwithstanding the 
severity or pervasiveness of the behavior when viewed in its totality. 34 
Mitigating doctrines, such as the continuing violation theory, can soften 
the impact of a short statute of limitations. However, lengthening the statute 
of limitations for sexual harassment claims serves the same purpose. 
Furthermore, doing so provides an added benefit: reducing the amount of 
litigation surrounding mitigating doctrines like the continuing violation 
theory.35 
ll. INTERNAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES 
Institutional grievance procedures are another impediment facing 
plaintiffs who allege sexual harassment. It certainly makes sense to give 
employers and educational institutions incentives to prevent and correct 
harassment. At the same time, however, such internal procedures are fraught 
29. See Fitzgerald, supra note II, at 1074 (citation omitted) (concluding that a short statute of 
limitations is unjustified because it takes victims of harassment "time to sort through their experience and 
decide on a course of action"). 
30. See id. (noting that a longer statute of limitations for filing complaints is necessary because 
women often hesitate to come forward with complaints of harassment, in particular because of the negative 
consequences associated with reporting). 
31. See Tsai, supra note 28. 
32. LINDEMANN & KAI>UE, supra note 14, at 449. 
33. Tsai, supra note 28, at 539 (noting the "wide variety of inconsistent evaluative and doctrinal 
standards [that] have developed - many of which are subject to varying interpretations, even within the 
circuits that created them"). 
34. See id. at 542-46. 
35. See Tsai, supra note 28, at 559. 
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with problems. There is no effective oversight of the procedures used by most 
institutions. Moreover, employers and educational institutions have a built-in 
conflict of interest in any sexual harassment case: the institution is the 
potential defendant in any litigation brought by the employee or student 
alleging harassment. Yet, the Supreme Court's interpretation of institutional 
liability under both Title VII and Title IX basically requires plaintiffs alleging 
sexual harassment to use their in$titution's internal grievance procedure or 
risk losing in court, even at the summary judgment stage. 36 
A. Liability Standards Under Title VII 
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 37 the Supreme Court rejected a 
per se rule of liability for employers in hostile environment cases. 38 The Court 
distinguished between quid pro quo and hostile environment cases, noting that 
employer liability for hostile environment cases hinged on notice to the 
employer of the harassing conduct. 39 In doing so, the Court crafted a rule of 
liability at odds with the EEOC Guidelines at the time.40 Moreover, as Justice 
Marshall noted in his concurring opinion, neither the language of Title VII nor 
the law of agency commanded the rule of liability crafted by the majority's 
decision in Meritor. 
A supervisor's responsibilities do not begin and end with the power 
to hire, fire, and discipline employees, or with the power to 
recommend such actions. Rather, a supervisor is charged with the 
day-to-day supervision of the work environment and with ensuring a 
safe, productive workplace. There is no reason why abuse of the latter 
authority should have different consequences than abuse of the 
former. In both cases it is the authority vested in the supervisor by the 
employer that enables him to commit the wrong: it is precisely 
because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the 
employer's authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual 
conduct on subordinates. There is therefore no justification for a 
special rule, to be applied only in "hostile environment" cases, that 
sexual harassment does not create employer liability until the 
36. See Grossman, supra note 28, at 710 (footnote omitted) (noting that in Title VII sexual 
harassment cases many trial courts jump right to the employer's affirmative defense and, if "the affirmative 
defense is viable [the court], without further analysis, [] grant[s] [] summary judgment to the employer"). 
37. 477 u.s. 57 (1986). 
38. /d. at 72. 
39. /d.at?l-72. 
40. See id. at 71 (citation omitted) (noting that its liability rule for hostile environment cases was 
"in some tension with the EEOC Guidelines, which held an employer liable for the acts of its agents without 
regard to notice"). 
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employee suffering the discrimination notifies other supervisors. No 
such requirement appears·in the statute, and no such requirement can 
coherently be drawn from the law of agency.41 
Thus, Meritor created a requirement unique to sexu'al harassment cases, 
reposing with employers what has become an essentially unsupervised "first 
shot" at resolving complaints of harassment. .. 
In two subsequent decisions, Burlington Industries v. Ellerth42 and 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,43 the Supreme Court expanded on Meritor' s 
discussion of employer liability. The Court held that employer liability turns 
not on the labels quid pro quo or hostile environment, but rather on whether 
the employee demonstrates that she suffered a tangible employment action.44 
The Court limited tangible employment' actions to "significant change[s] in 
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment 
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant 
change in benefits."45 As a result, it is not clear whether a downgrade on a 
performance evaluation rises to the level of a tangible employment action, 
absent a showing that the performance evaluation affected a promotion 
decision, for example. 
If the employee fails to demonstrate a tangible employment decision, 
then the employer may avail itself of a judicially created affirmative defense. 
The employer may escape liability for sexual harassment if it can demonstrate 
that (1) it "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior," and (2) the "employee unreasonably failed to 
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.'946 
The Supreme Court's decisions in Meritor, Ellerth, and Faragher have 
tipped the scales in favor oflimiting employer liability for hostile environment 
harassment by supervisory personnel if employees fail to use their employer's 
grievance procedure, even though no such requirement exists for any other 
cause of action brought pursuant to Title Vll. Congress did not condition 
Title Vll liability on employees' use of internal grievance procedures, so it is 
unclear why such limitations should apply to sexual harassment cases. "When 
Congress intends that litigants invoke grievance mechanisms before pursuing 
judicial remedies for violations of civil rights, it states the precondition 
41. /d. at 76-77 (Marshall, J ., concurring) (italics in original). 
42. 524 u.s. 742 (1998). 
43. 524 u.s. 775 (1998). 
44. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752-54,761. 
45. /d. at 761 (citations omitted). 
46. /d. at 765. 
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explicitly. "47 By shifting the focus toward internal procedures, the Court gave 
employers the wrong incentive. If an employer can escape liability by 
developing .and disseminating a sexual harassment policy and complaint 
procedure, then the employer's focus shifts away from changing the causes of 
harassment - the organization's culture and a male-dominated workforce48 -
toward developing a policy and procedure that protect it from liability. 
B. Liability Standard Under Title IX 
The Supreme Court's decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent 
School District9 effectively eliminates an educational institution's liability for 
sexual harassment of students. In Gebser, the Supreme Court did not overrule 
its earlier precedents in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 50 establishing a 
private cause of action for Title IX violations, and Franklin v. Gwinnett 
County Public Schools, 51 recognizing a right to monetary relief for such 
violations. 52 In effect, the Court nullified the holdings of those two cases. 53 
After Gebser, a Title IX plaintiff who establishes that a teacher sexually 
harassed her cannot recover monetary damages unless she can demonstrate 
that she reported the harassment to a school official with the authority to 
47. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, et al. at 10, Meritor Savings Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979) (citation omitted). 
48. Recent research indicates that an organization's tolerance for harassing behavior and a 
masculine job gender context predict the likelihood of harassment occurring in an organization. See Louise 
F. Fitzgerald et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Sexual Harassment in Organizations: A Test of an 
Integrated Model, 82 J. APPLIED PsYCHOL. 578,586 (1997) (finding that "a male-dominated workplace" 
in which there are "large numbers of male workers, combined with traditionally male-oriented tasks" is a 
significant predictorof"high levels of sexual harassment'' and that women who perceive their organizations 
as "tolerant of sexual harassment ... experience considerably higher levels of harassment"); see also 
Theresa M. Glomb et al., Ambient Sexual Hara,ssment: An Integrated Model of Antecedents and 
Consequences, 72 ORG. BEHA v. &. HUM. DEcisiON PROC. 309, 321 ( 1997) (finding that an organization's 
climate, as measured by the "employees' perceptions that the organization is tolerant of sexual harassment," 
is "positively related to [the employees'] experiences of harassment as well as to the ambient level ofsexual 
harassment in their work group"); Matthew S. Hesson-Mcinnis &. Louise Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: 
A Preliminary Test of an Integrative Model, 21 J. APPLIED PsYCHOL. 877, 887, 890 (1997) (finding that 
three factors predict the likelihood of sexual harassment: (I) victim vulnerability, for example, being 
younger or less educated, (2) "a male-dominated job context," and (3) an organization that is "more tolerant 
of sexual harassment"); cf. id. at 898 (suggesting that "strong affirmative action programs and moving 
(large numbers of) women into jobs traditionally held by men may prove a reasonable organizational 
strategy for reducing harassment"). 
49. 524 u.s. 274 (1998). 
so. 441 u.s. 677 (1979). 
s I. 503 u.s. 60 ( 1992). 
52. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 282-93. 
53. Lawton, supra note 3, at 114. 
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"institute corrective measures,"54 and the school official was deliberately 
indifferent to her complaint of sexual harassment. 55 
In Gebser, the Title IX plaintiff, who was a high school freshman and 
sophomore at the time of the harassment, 56 lost at the summary judgment stage 
because she had failed to complain about a male teacher's sexual comments 
and advances, even though "it [was] not at all clear" that the school district 
had either a formal sexual harassment policy or a grievance procedure. 57 Even 
if Gebser had complained, however, she still may have lost if she had 
complained to a school official lacking the authority to remedy the 
harassment. In Canutillo Independent School District v. Leija, 58 for example, 
the school district escaped liability because the parent of a second-grade girl 
had notified only the student's homeroom teacher that another teacher had 
sexually molested her daughter. 59 
As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Gebser, the majority's decision 
gives academic institutions no incentive to develop effective anti-harassment 
policies and procedures.60 Why should a school district or university concern 
itself with having an effective policy and grievance procedure? "After all, a 
school may escape liability for sexual harassment of a student even if the 
school has no sexual harassment policy or procedure, all of a victim's teachers 
know of the harassing behavior, and the school is grossly negligent in its 
handling of the sexual harassment complaint."61 Consequently, while 
expressing its concern about the incidence of sexual harassment in educational 
institutions, the Court in Gebser effectively eviscerated the ability of students 
to obtain judicial relief for sexual harassment at school. 
C. What's Wrong with Internal Grievance Procedures? 
1. Conflict of Interest 
Why must a prospective plaintiff use a grievance procedure designed and 
controlled exclusively by the prospective defendant?· The conflict of interest 
inherent in such an arrangement is apparent. ~'(l]nternal grievance procedures 
are obstructed by an inherent conflict within the institution as it tries 
simultaneously to eliminate sexual harassment from the work and academic 
54. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. 
55. See id. 
56. ld. at 277-78. 
57. ld. at 305 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 291-92. 
58. 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1265 (1997). 
59. /d. at 400-02. 
60. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 300-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
61. Lawton, supra note 3, at 115-16. 
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environment, and to insulate itself from liability. "62 Because a woman who 
brings an internal grievance for sexual harassment has a potential legal claim 
against the party controlling the procedure, the institution's goals are not 
necessarily consonant with those of the victim. It is little wonder, then, that 
many victims of harassment choose not to use their institutions' internal 
grievance procedures, believing that nothing will be done63 or that they will 
experience negative consequences, including retaliation.64 
Nowhere is the conflict of interest between institution and victim more 
apparent than on college and university campuses. If a tenured professor 
harasses a student, the university's interest is aligned with that of the tenured 
professor. Tenure provides the professor with a claim that he cannot be 
dismissed absent cause.65 In public universities, the tenured professor can 
argue that he has a property interest in his tenure.66 The risk of a lawsuit by 
the tenured professor is significantly higher than the risk of a lawsuit by a 
student. The tenured professor, by virtue of his lifetime employment with the 
institution, has a strong incentive to fight any discipline, censure, or 
termination. The student, on the other hand, passes through the institution and 
ultimately graduates. 
The record keeping practices of some universities highlight the tension 
between the institution's desire to protect itself from liability and its long-term 
commitment to reducing sexual harassment. Educational institutions are not 
required to report the number, nature, or resolution of sexual harassment 
complaints.67 In addition, many universities use both formal and informal 
62. Jennie Kihnley, Unraveling the Ivory Fabric: Institutional Obstacles to the Handling of Sexual 
Harassment Complaints, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 69, 70 (2000); see RICHARD EDWARDS, RIGHTS AT 
WORK:EMPWYMENTREl.ATIONSINTHEPoST-UNIONERA216-17(1993)(notingthatnonunioncomplaint 
and grievance systems '1ustifiably bring upon themselves the suspicion of conflict of interest, inasmuch 
as company officials are likely to think beyond the actual merits of the grievance immediately before them 
and worry about such matters as the besmirching of the firm's reputation, showing support for the 
supervisory staff, and the implications of a decision for other employees"); cf Meet the Press (NBC 
television broadcast, June 24, 2001) (stating Senator Tom Harkin's concern that requiring a patient, whose 
health maintenance organization decides not to cover referral to a specialist, to appeal to a medical review 
board selected and paid for by the HMO "put[s] the fox in charge of the chicken coop"). 
63. See MSPB REPoRT III, supra note 4, at 34-35 (finding that 20% of victims failed to report for 
this reason); RHODE, supra note I, at 101 (footnote omitted) (stating that [women] believe, quite rationally, 
that complaining will have little effect on their harassers and could make their own situations worse"). 
64. See MSPB REPoRT III, supra note 4, at 35 (finding that 29% of victims of harassment failed to 
report because they believed reporting "would make [their] work situation unpleasant" while 17% of 
victims did not report because they believed reporting "would adversely affect [their] career''); Lawton, 
supra note 3, at 126 (summarizing studies). 
65. Lawton, supra note 3, at 119. 
66. /d. 
67. /d. at 93. 
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procedures for resolving complaints of sexual harassment. 68 Yet, a number of 
universities fail to maintain records of either informal69 or formal 
complaints/0 or allow for decentralized reporting/1 which makes it difficult 
to monitor the number and nature of complaints filed. 72 Without records, how 
can a college or university determine whether its own internal procedures are 
operating properly? Furthermore, the university has no incentive to maintain 
records because records open up the institution to liability, especially in the 
case of repeat offenders. 73 
Suppose the University employs Professor X, who during his tenure has 
engaged in repeated incidents of sexual harassment. 74 Each time, the student 
has used the university's informal grievance procedure. The University does 
not maintain records of informal complaints of sexual harassment. Moreover, 
as is typical with informal procedures, the University did not impose sanctions 
against Professor X because no fact-finding occurred. Professor X has little 
incentive to stop his behavior, which is relatively cost-free. Suppose, 
however, that one year a student decides to file suit against the University 
based on Professor X's harassing behavior. If records do not exist, the 
university need not provide them to the student's attorney during discovery. 
As a result, the University is not charged with knowledge of the professor's 
behavior, unless the student can find out on her own about prior complaints, 
contact those complainants, and obtain their cooperation to act as witnesses 
in her case. If she fails to do so and the University took some action on her 
complaint, e.g., mediating the dispute, the student will lose her Title IX case, 
most likely at the summary judgment stage. 
68. ld. at 88. 
69. See id. at 150-51 Thl.I (noting that University of Maryland at College Park, Miami University, 
and the State University of New York at Binghamton do not keep records of the numbers of informal 
complaints filed, while the University of California at Berkeley has no "'statistical breakdown of 
complaints' based on [the] nature and resolution" of the complaint). 
70. See Lawton, supra note 3, at 150-5 I Thl. I (noting that the University of Maryland at College 
Park does not keep records of formal complaints while the University of California at Berkeley '" [h]as no 
way to retrieve or identify'" such records when a public records request is made). 
71. See id. (noting that the University of Florida at Gainesville does not maintain records in a central 
location). 
72. See Kihnley, supra note 62, at 74 (explaining that "central record keeping of the complaints is 
crucial for maintaining accurate records of the prevalence and outcome of sexual harassment 
incidents ... "). 
73. See Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Antecedents and Consequences of Sexual Harassment in 
Organizations: An Integrated Model, in JOB STRESS IN A CHANGING WORKFORCE: INVESTIGATING GENDER, 
DIVERSITY, AND FAMR.Y IsSUES 55,69 (Gwendolyn Puryear Keita & Joseph J. Hurrell, Jr. eds., 1994) 
(noting that "the single most formidable obstacle" to obtaining data about sexual harassment in 
organizations is the fear of "documenting the existence of a problem carrying legal liability"). 
74. This example is taken from Lawton, supra note 3, at 94-95. 
2001] TIPPING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 529 
2. A Private System of Law 
Internal grievance procedures are private. Neither employers nor 
educational institutions are required to report the number, nature, or outcome 
of sexual harassment complaints filed with the institution. Nor are employers 
or educational institutions required to undertake climate studies to determine 
the extent to which employees and students know about and trust the internal 
process. Hence, in the vast majority of cases that never make it to court, there 
is no oversight of the institution's internal grievance procedure. 
Privatizing the system of harassment resolution creates a system of law 
over which there is little public scrutiny. 75 Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. 
Circuit "recommends that conflicts arising in undefined areas of employment 
discrimination law 'should be resolved by judges and other officials charged 
with lawmaking in the public interest, rather than private dispute resolvers. "'76 
Many might criticize Judge Edwards's recommendation as impractical, citing 
the increased number of sexual harassment complaints 77 and the need for some 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism. However, there are several flaws 
with this argument. 
First, the number of claims file~ does not necessitate a private system of 
resolution, created by the potential defendant over which there is little 
scrutiny. In Title Vll cases, for example, sexual harassment victims already 
have to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC 
prior to filing suit in federal court.78 The law does not require other Title Vll 
plaintiffs to use internal grievance procedures or risk losing in court.79 Why, 
then, must employees alleging sexual harassment bring their complaints to 
their employer before going to the EEOC and federal court? Second, there is 
no empirical evidence to support the courts' reliance on policies and 
procedures as effective mechanisms for preventing and correcting sexual 
harassment on the job or within academic institutions. 
In general, the current set of policies, procedures, and training used 
in organizations has not solved the problem of sexual harassment. Nor 
is there any evidence that they have or will lead most targets of 
harassment to come forward and make formal complaints or that they 
are greatly inhibiting would-be sexual harassers. While they may be 
having a positive impact and are probably leading more victims to 
75. Kihnley, supra note 62, at 72. 
76. /d. at 72 (citation omitted). 
77. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
78. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 14, at 508. 
79. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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come forward and are restraining some harassers, such effects have 
not been documented so far. 80 
There is a similar absence of empirical data on the efficacy of sexual 
harassment education and training programs.81 
If the primary goal of Title Vll, according to the Court in Faragher, is to 
prevent, rather than provide a remedy for, the harm caused by sexual 
harassment, 82 then it is interesting that no empirical data exists to support the 
assumption that having a sexual harassment policy and complaint procedure 
actual!y deters harassment in the workplace. This is not to suggest that 
harassment policies and procedures do not work; but, if such policies and 
procedures effectively deprive sexual harassment plaintiffs of the right to a 
remedy in court, then is there not some obligation to verify that they do, in 
fact, deter harassing conduct? If no such evidence exists, why do the courts 
place such heavy reliance on the plaintiffs' failure to invoke such policies and 
procedures? 
Third, the lack of oversight of internal grievance procedures created by 
employers and educational institutions, whose interests are not necessarily 
consonant with those of the grievant, is troubling. Suppose at State University 
each college has its own standing committee for investigating complaints of 
sexual harassment made by students, other faculty members, or employees. 83 
The University's procedure provides that the committee will review the 
evidence and make a determination whether the complaint of harassment has 
80. Barbara A. Gutek, Sexual Harassment Policy Initiatives, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, 
REsEARCH, AND TREA 1MENT 185, 1% (William 0' Donohue ed., 1997) (emphasis in original); see Elizabeth 
O'Hare Grundrnann et al., The Prevention of Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, 
RESEARCH, AND TREA1MENT 175, 176 (William O'Donohue ed., 1997) (noting the absence of published 
"empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of any company policy or educational program to reduce sexually 
harassing attitudes or behaviors"). 
81. RobertS. Moyer & An jan Nath, Some Effects of Brief Training Interventions on Perceptions 
of Sexual Harassment, 28 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 333, 334 ( 1998) (noting "the unpleasant empirical 
truth [ ] that almost nothing is known about the effects of sexual harassment education and training 
programs"); but see MSPB REPoRT III, supra note 4, at vii (expressing concern that "very widespread 
training and information efforts" had not reduced the incidence of sexually harassing behavior in the federal 
workforce). 
82. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 885, 805-06 (1998); contra Grossman, supra note 28, 
at 720-21 (footnotes omitted) (explaining that the Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher and Ellertlz were 
revisionist history, "elevat[ing] deterrence to the 'primary' goal [of Title VII] and [leaving] compensation 
by the wayside," notwithstanding earlier Court decisions that "had repeatedly recognized that Title VII 
ha[d] two separate, yet equally important goals: compensation and deterrence"). 
83. See, e.g., OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, RULES OF THE UNIVERSITY FACULTY: FACULTY, 
GOVERNANCE, AND COMMITTEES§ 3335-5-04(8)(1 ), (E), available at http://www.osu.edu/offices/trustees/ 
rules5/ru5-04.html (last visited July 11, 2001). 
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merit. 84 The committee's determination, however, must be "based on clear 
and convincing evidence."85 State University has created a higher burden of 
proof for complainants than they would have had had they filed suit in court. 
The higher burden of proof means that claims that may have legal merit do not 
give rise to sanctions under State University's internal grievance procedure. 
Of course, a victim of sexual harassment may still sue State University 
if she is dissatisfied with the results of its internal investigation. But, after 
losing in an internal investigation, some complainants may believe that their 
case is not strong enough to merit pursuing it through traditional legal 
channels. Suppose, however, that the complainant is a student who decides 
to sue State University at the termination of the University's internal 
investigation. Under the standard enunciated in Gebser, she will undoubtedly 
lose her claim for monetary damages because the University was not 
"deliberately indifferent" to her complaint. In fact, it instituted an 
investigation and examined the evidence presented by both parties. 
The liability standard established by the Supreme Court in Burlington 
and Faragher, unlike that in Gebser, promises, as a theoretical matter, greater 
oversight of employers' internal grievance procedures. 86 As a practical matter, 
however, many employers escape liability by merely adopting and 
disseminating a sexual harassment policy and procedure. 87 The courts assume, 
84. See id. at § 3335-5-04(E)(2). 
85. See id. 
86. See David Sherwyn et al., Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your '1-800' Harassment 
Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual 
Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAML. REV. 1265, 1289 (2001) (footnote omitted) (noting that "[f]ollowing 
the Ellerth and Faragher decisions [)a quick consensus emerged among employers, their consultants, and 
attorneys that ... the mere creation and dissemination of policies would not suffice"); Grossman, supra 
note 28, at 675 (footnote omitted) (stating that "[m)any commentators interpreted" the liability standard 
in Ellerth and Faragher to be "a blow to employers based on the perception that employers would now be 
held accountable for workplace harassment without regard to their culpability"). 
87. See, e.g., Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1297-99 (II th Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000) (finding that the dissemination of an anti-harassment policy and complaint 
procedure which provided employees with "multiple avenues [for] lodging a complaint" satisfied the 
employer's obligation to use reasonable care to prevent sexually harassing conduct in the workplace); Riffle 
v. The Sports Authority, Inc., No. 99-2192,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5236, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 28, 2000) 
(concluding that the employer had satisfied its obligation to prevent and correct harassing behavior by 
having a sexual harassment policy); Leugers v. Pinkerton Security and Investigative Servs., No. 98-3501, 
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1831, at *8 (6th Cir. Feb. 3, 2000) (holding that the employer had satisfied Ellerth 's 
requirement of preventing and promptly correcting sexually harassing conduct because it had distributed 
a sexual harassment policy and complaint procedure that allowed the plaintiff employee to bypass her 
immediate supervisor and the employer had suspended and then terminated the harasser); see also Sherwyn 
et al., supra note 86, at 1290 (footnote omitted} (noting that "the overwhelming majority of cases holds that 
an employer exercises reasonable care when it has a policy that is disseminated to all employees, and it 
provides employees with an opportunity to report the harassment to someone other than a harassing 
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without requiring any evidence from the employer, that every employer's 
policy and complaint procedure· is equally effective at preventing and 
correcting harassing conduct. However, there is no empirical evidence to 
suggest that harassment policies and procedures actually deter harassing 
conduct in the workplace, let alone evidence suggesting that all harassment 
policies and complaint procedures are equally effective at doing so.88 
Moreover, the affirmative defense from Burlington and Faragher only applies 
once the employee has successfully shown that she was sexually harassed. In 
an alarming number of cases, however, the federal courts award summary 
judgment to employers because the court concludes that the harassing conduct 
was not "severe or pervasive." As a result, the employee's opportunity to 
obtain judicial review of the employer's internal grievance procedure is lost. 
ill. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Over the past decade, commentators have discussed the ease with which 
federal courts grant employer motions for summary judgment in employment 
discrimination cases.89 Because employment discrimination cases, e.g., 
disparate treatment, typically involve questions about the employer's intent, 
summary judgment should be used sparingly.90 Nevertheless, courts are 
constructing various devices in order to make it easier for employers to prevail 
on motions for summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.91 
The summary judgment phenomenon also has had its impact on sexual 
harassment law.92 In Meritor, the Supreme Court held that sexual harassment 
supervisor''); Grossman, supra note 28, at 675 (concluding that Ellerth and Faragher "created a virtual safe 
harbor'' from liability for employers). 
88. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
89. See, e.g., l..awton, supra note 10; Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured 
Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203 
( 1993); cf Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination 
Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, N-F at http://www.findjustice.com/mmr/news/eisenber-
schwab/schwab-report.htm (last visited July 18, 2001) (finding that "[e]mployment discrimination 
defendants appealing adverse pretrial motions often get the judgment reversed ( 44.74 percent of the time}, 
while employment discrimination plaintiffs appealing adverse pretrial motions rarely get the judgment 
reversed ( 11.03 percent)"). 
90. See l..awton, supra note 10, at 628 nn.l88-89 (citing cases standing for the proposition). 
91. See id. at 617-61. 
92. See Theresa M. Beiner, T11e Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 
WAKE FORESTL. REV. 71 (1999). Professor Beiner's article was published prior to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). In Reeves, the Supreme 
Court admonished the lower federal courts not to weigh the evidence on motions for summary judgment 
or judgment as a matter of law. /d. at 150. If the courts heed this admonition, it will prove more difficult 
to grant employer motions for summary judgment on the grounds that the alleged harassment was not severe 
or pervasive. It is not clear, however, what impact Reeves will have on the federal courts' willingness to 
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is not actionable unless it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the 
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working 
environment. "'93 Determining whether behavior is severe or pervasive is a 
fact-intensive inquiry. Therefore, it is surprising that so many courts are 
granting employer motions for summary judgment in sexual harassment cases 
on the grounds that the complained-of behavior is not sufficiently severe or 
pervasive.94 
In a study published in 1999, Professor Theresa Beiner determined that 
between the years 1987 and 1998, federal district courts granted employer 
motions for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to 
establish that the complained-of behavior was severe or pervasive in 175 out 
of 302 cases- a rate of 58%.95 Moreover, appellate courts are not checking 
the district court's flagrant abuse of summary judgment. During the same 
time period ( 1987 through 1998), the appellate courts upheld district court 
orders granting summary judgment in 76% of the cases heard.96 
These statistics are startling for two reasons. First, whether behavior is 
severe or pervasive is a highly fact-intensive inquiry, so summary judgment 
should be granted sparingly. Second, Professor Beiner' s statistics only include 
cases in which the court granted summary judgment because the behavior was 
not severe or pervasive. Employers have other weapons in their arsenal for 
obtaining summary judgment:97 (1) failure to file a timely EEOC claim, and 
(2) after Burlington and Faragher, decided in 1998, the affirmative defense 
based on the employer's internal grievance procedures. Consequently, 
Professor Beiner's statistics underestimate the number of sexual harassment 
claims disposed of on employer motions for summary judgment. 
In order to grant summary judgment on the grounds that the behavior is 
not severe or pervasive enough, however, many federal courts are simply 
ignoring the "totality of the circumstances" standard used by the EEOC98 and 
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 99 Instead, 
make contested fact determinations on summary judgment. See Anne Lawton, The Cultural Myth of 
Meritocracy, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. Q. (forthcoming 2002). Moreover, courts can use other devices, such as 
the affirmative defense from Ellerth and Faragher, to grant employer motions for summary judgment. See 
supra note 36. 
93. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citation omitted). 
94. See Beiner, supra note 92, at 101-02. 
95. /d. at 101 Thl. Two. 
96. /d. at I 00 Thl. One. Out of a total of SS cases, the Courts of Appeals affirmed the district court's 
order of summary judgment in 42 cases. 
97. See id. at 74 n.l7 (citing to selected articles forming part of the "great deal of practical 
commentary on advising defendants how to obtain summary judgment in hostile environment cases"). 
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(b) (1997). 
99. 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (stating that "whether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be 
determined only by looking at all the circumstances"). 
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many federal courts carve up the plaintiffs case, examining incidents of 
harassment in isolation or in "discrete parts" in order to conclude that the 
plaintiffs allegations fail the "severe or pervasive" requirement. 100 Morris 
v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 101 a recent case from the Sixth Circuit, 
illustrates the problem. 
Judy Morris began work as a secretary for the Oldham County Road 
Department in 1984}02 In late 1994, Brent Likins became the new County 
Road Engineer; the position gave him supervisory authority over Morris. 103 
Morris claimed that Likins often made jokes with sexual overtones, referred 
to her on one occasion as "Hot Lips," and commented several times on what 
she was wearing}04 In March of 1995, Morris received her second 
performance evaluation from Likins with an overall rating of "very good. " 105 
In her first evaluation, Likins rated Morris's performance as "excellent."106 
In front of another supervisor, Jim Lentz, Morris asked Likins why her 
performance rating had dropped from "excellent" to "very good."107 Likins 
told Morris that she '"could come into his office and then after [they] were 
finished he would mark [her] excellents [sic] and then [they] would go from 
there. "' 108 Morris informed Likins that '"if that is what it took ... he could 
have the job because [she] was not going to tolerate it. "'109 Both Morris and 
Lentz, the other supervisor, interpreted Likins's statement as suggesting that 
Morris could obtain a more favorable evaluation by providing Likins with 
sexual favors. 110 
Morris complained about Likins's behavior to County Judge John 
Black} 11 Judge Black wrote Likins a letter about the alleged behavior, 
expressing Judge Black's desire to have Likins and Morris "work out [their] 
problems and differences. "112 Morris claimed that Likins became increasingly 
critical of her work after receiving Judge Black's letter. Morris complained 
again to Judge Black, who then told Likins not to communicate directly with 
Morris and not to be around Morris without a third party being present. 113 
100. Seiner, supra note 92, at 97-98. 
101. 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2000). 
102. /d. at 786. Morris performed clerical and secretarial duties. 
103. /d. at 787. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 





Ill. Morris, 201 F.3d at 787. 
112. ld. 
113. Id. 
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According to Morris, however, Likins ignored Judge Black's advice. Morris 
claimed that Likins called her at least thirty times on the telephone and, on 
several occasions, sat in the Road Department parking lot, "looking in [her] 
window and making faces at her."114 One day, Likins allegedly followed 
Morris home from work, pulled alongside her mailbox, and gave her the 
finger. 115 Morris also alleged that, on several occasions, Likins threw roofing 
nails on her driveway at home, and destroyed a television set that Morris had 
watched at work. 116 
The trial court granted the County's motion for summary judgment on 
Morris's sexual harassment claim. 117 In affirming the lower court's order 
granting summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit explained that Morris had 
complained about only four categories of sex-related harassment: ( 1) the dirty 
jokes, (2) the sexual proposition, (3) the one-time reference to Morris as "Hot 
Lips," and ( 4) the comments about Morris's state of dress. 118 According to the 
court, the retaliatory behavior could not form part of Morris's sexual 
harassment claim because Likins had not engaged in that behavior "because 
of sex."119 
There is no evidence in the record to suggest that any of Likins's 
alleged offensive post-transfer conduct was committed "because of 
sex." Rather, it seems to have been motivated entirely by his personal 
displeasure toward plaintiff and the complaints she made to Black. As 
we recently observed, "Personal conflict does not equate with 
discriminatory animus."120 
Without the retaliatory conduct, the court concluded that the remaining 
examples of sex-based conduct did not suffice to satisfy the requirement that 
harassment be severe or pervasive. While acknowledging that the "sexual 
advance was truly offensive, it was the only advance that Likins allegedly 
made."121 By labeling the sexual advance as an isolated incident, the court 
concluded that Morris's allegations "consisted of the kind of simple teasing, 
offhand comments, and isolated incidents that Faragher made clear did not 
amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of a plaintiffs 
employment. " 122 
114. /d. 
115. /d. 
116. Morris, 201 F.3d at 787. 
117. /d. 
118. Id. at 790. 
119. /d. at 790-91. 
120. /d. at 791 (foomote and citation omitted). 
121. Morris, 201 F.3d at 790. 
122. /d. 
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The majority's decision in Morris is problematic for two reasons. First, 
the conclusion that the retaliatory conduct was not based on sex flies in the 
face of the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc. 123 In Oncale, the Supreme Court held that Title Vll covers 
same-sex harassment.124 The Court in Oncale explained that harassment 
"need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of 
discrimination on the basis of sex. " 125 While the retaliatory conduct in Morris 
was not sexual in nature, it occurred because Morris had complained about 
Likins's sexual conduct at work. In other words, Likins retaliated because 
Morris rejected his sexual advance and complained about his sexual behavior 
at work to Judge Black. Male employees similarly situated to Morris did not 
face her dilemma: complain about Likins's improper sexual behavior and risk 
an escalation of the harassing conduct, or suffer in silence. Therefore, it is 
simply legally erroneous, under Oncale, to separate Likins's retaliatory 
conduct from his sexual conduct. 126 
Second, as Judge Clay noted in his dissent, the majority's decision 
ignored prevailing Sixth Circuit precedent. In Williams v. General Motors 
Corp., 127 the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment on plaintiff Williams's hostile environment claim. 128 The trial court 
granted summary judgment because Williams failed to demonstrate that the 
harassment was severe or pervasive. 129 The Sixth Circuit reversed the trial 
court's order, noting that the court had to examine the "totality of the 
circumstances" in evaluating the plaintiffs claim of a hostile work 
environment based on sex. 130 Instead, the trial court had improperly carved up 
the plaintiffs allegations, making it easier to grant summary judgment. 
In this case, however, the district court divided and categorized the 
reported incidents, divorcing them from their context and depriving 
them of their full force. The court's analysis is clearly premised on an 
impermissible disaggregation of the incidents .... 
Of course, when the complaints are broken into their theoretical 
component parts, each claim is more easily dismissed .... Thus, the 
123. 523 u.s. 75 (1998). 
124. ld. at 79-80. 
125. ld. at 80. 
126. See Morris, 201 F.3d at 797 (Clay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that "the 
majority's legal conclusion that to consider the other acts would be a 'mistake' is erroneous"). 
127. 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999), reiJ'g, en bane, denied, No. 97-3351, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 
26482 (Sept. 30, 1999). 
128. ld. at 553. 
129. Id. at 558. 
130. Id. at 562. 
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issue is not whether each incident of harassment standing alone is 
sufficient to sustain the cause of action in a hostile environment case, 
but whether-taken together-the reported incidents make out such 
a case. 131 
537 
Without overruling its earlier precedent in Williams, however, the Sixth 
Circuit in Morris did exactly what it had previously held as improper. Not 
only did the court disaggregate the sexually based conduct from the retaliatory 
conduct, but the court also isolated the sexual ad vance from Likins's verbal 
remarks. 132 While noting that the sexual advance was "truly offensive," the 
court nonetheless concluded that it was an isolated incident. 133 Although 
Likins propositioned Morris on only one occasion, he also engaged in other 
behavior, such as remarking on the state of her dress and calling her "Hot 
Lips," that formed the context for the sexual advance. By isolating each 
incident or category of incidents and describing each as insufficient to 
demonstrate severe or pervasive conduct, the court was able to more easily 
affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment. 
Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Morris is not an anomaly. 
All too often courts dispose of sexual harassment claims on employer motions 
for summary judgment. 134 By doing so, they send a message to litigants about 
the availability of relief for harassment on the job, which, in turn, reduces the 
number of women willing to come forward with complaints of sexual 
harassment. 135 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It has been fifteen years since the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor, 
yet the incidence of sexual harassment both on the job and in the classroom 
has not declined. The reason lies with sexual harassment law itself. The law 
creates disincentives for women to file complaints of harassment and makes 
it difficult to hold employers and educational institutions liable for harassing 
behavior. 
Unlike other causes of action, sexual harassment has a very short statute 
of limitations, which restricts the number of meritorious claims heard by the 
131. I d. (emphasis in original). 
132. For a critique of the tendency of many courts to disaggregate sexual from nonsexual allegations 
of harassment, see Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L. J. 1683, 1713-29 
(1998). 
133. Morris, 201 F.3d at790. 
134. See supra note 36, and notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
135. See Samuellssacharoff & George Lowenstein, SecondTiwughts about Summary Judgment, I 00 
YALE L. J. 73, 75 (1990) (noting that "liberalized summary judgment inhibits the filing of otherwise 
meritorious suits .... "). 
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EEOC and the courts. In addition, sexual harassment victims must use 
grievance procedures designed by the institution that they seek to hold liable 
for the harassment, even though there is no empirical data to support the belief 
that such internal procedures actually deter harassment. Furthermore, because 
neither employers nor educational institutions must keep records of 
harassment complaints filed or their resolution, there is little effective 
oversight of these private systems of law. Finally, even if a woman files a 
timely claim of harassment, she is likely to lose on a motion for summary 
judgment. 
These obstacles to relief give institutions not only the wrong incentives 
but also the tools to ensure that sexual harassment victims do not obtain a trial 
on the merits. The end result is a system that tips the scales sharply in favor 
of employers and educational institutions at the expense of the victims of 
harassment. 
